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Abstract
The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and
modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tac-
tics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources
such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission
control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we
propose an alternative approach to securing an open dis-
tributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring con-
sensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social
network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes ex-
pressing their trust relationships through the ledger can
bootstrap and operate a value system, and general trans-
action system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We
empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated
Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of
those systems to do so.
1 Introduction
Distributed ledgers, and blockchains, as they are some-
times called, provide peer-to-peer open transaction sys-
tems used for alternative currencies, such as Bit-
coin [Nak08], or general distributed execution of code,
often called ‘smart contracts’ [Woo14]. The main in-
novation of Nakamoto consensus [Nak08], underpinning
both systems, is the open nature of the system that al-
lows infrastructure nodes to come-and-go, and partici-
pate on the basis of solving proof-of-work cryptographic
puzzles. However, this is computationally expensive and
resource intensive.
Alternatives based on proof-of-stake [Dai98] do not
consume resources, but require nodes to lock some
‘stake’ in a native crypto-currency, to participate and
slash this stake upon detecting misbehaviour. However,
there are valid concerns around such systems: locked
stake represents a loss of opportunity. The consensus
favors ‘richer’ nodes, that as a result get richer, which
∗This work was done while the authors where at chainspace.io.
may in turn threaten decentralization and may lead to at-
tacks by minority players with wealth. Finally, the val-
ues it embeds relate to ‘boardroomdemocracy’ (as Bryan
Ford suggests), and may not be aligned with principles of
openness and equity.
In this work we introduce a new consensus mecha-
nism, SybilQuorum, that allows peers to establish a dis-
tributed ledger without the need for either proof-of-work,
or other physical resources, or proof-of-stake to elimi-
nate Sybil attacks. The system is open to new mem-
bers, and permissionless, making it competitive with
Nakamoto consensus. It is based on an established
line of work related to Sybil defences leveraging Social
Networks, starting with protecting Distributed Hash Ta-
bles [DLKA05], and pursued by SybilGuard [YKGF08],
SybilLimit [YGKX10], and SybilInfer [DM09]. We also
present a hybrid system, SybilQuorum-hybrid, that com-
bines stake and social networks to further strengthen
Sybil resistance.
Our contributions include:
1. A proposal for achieving open consensus backed by
social links, embodied in the SybilQuorum-core de-
sign.
2. Extensions to integrate aspects of proof-of-stake
to enhance Sybil defences, and prevent wealthy
nodes from controlling the consensus, namely
SybilQuorum-hybrid.
3. An extension to the theory of Federated Byzan-
tine Agreement Systems (FBAS), and efficient al-
gorithms based on this theory to test for their safety
and liveness.
4. A concrete design, including integration with
specific consensus mechanisms compatible with
SybilQuorum at a systems level.
5. An evaluation of the strength of SybilQuorum based
1
on real-world social graphs, and the conditions un-
der which it enhances security against Sybil attacks.
2 Background and Related work
The Sybil attack was introduced by Douceur [Dou02], in
relation to engineering peer-to-peer systems, and identi-
fied types of defences: admission control through central
authentication, and resource constraints. Permissioned
ledgers, such as Hyperledger [ABB+18] or Quora, take
the first approach, and only allow known and desig-
nated nodes to participate in consensus. Open distributed
ledgers, including Bitcoin and Ethereum follow the sec-
ond paradigm. Proof of Work was first proposed by
Back, as Hashcash [B+02], to prevent Denial of Service.
In the context of spam its economic efficiency was ques-
tioned by Clayton and Laurie [LC04].
Proof-of-stake systems were proposed first in the 90s
byWei Dai, in B-money [Dai98]. Modern proof-of-stake
systems, such as Ouroboros [KRDO17] allow users to
lock and delegate stake, and sample those users propor-
tionately to their stake to determine an order in which
blocks are produced in a blockchain system. Consen-
sus therefore remains open, in that anyone who can buy
some currency and lock it as stake can participate. How-
ever, there are serious concerns with this approach: the
most fundamental one being that very wealthy parties
may afford to acquire a lot of stake, and abuse it to ex-
tract value out of the system. Since stake often allows
nodes to mine blocks, and reap rewards, the economics
of proof-of-stake may lead to oligarchies through a “rich
get richer” dynamic.
A number of blockchain systems consider some trust
judgments between nodes and leverage them to achieve
consensus. Stellar [Maz15] considers that each node
links to other nodes, and uses these direct trust judgments
to form quorums in which byzantine consensus may be
run — this is the closest related system to SybilQuorum.
We use the definition and security concepts introduced in
Stellar, such as a Federated Byzantine Agreement Sys-
tem (FBAS) and a disposable set (DSet), as a basis for
our security arguments and evaluation. However, Stel-
lar only considers direct judgments to form an FBAS,
rather than the topology of the full social network. Rip-
ple [AKM+15] allows participants to connect to each
other, but does not solve the Sybil defence problem di-
rectly, and does not achieve inter-node consensus in a
strong manner. Instead, each node may run its own cur-
rency and economy, and rely on others’ willingness to
act as an exchange to transfer value between nodes that
are not directly connected.
Besides blockchains, systems leveraging social net-
works — and explicit trust judgments of users about
each other — have been proposed to combat Sybil at-
tacks. Early work considers leveraging the ‘introduc-
tion graph’, by which nodes get to access a Distributed
Hash Table through other nodes, to ensure routing secu-
rity [DLKA05]. Raph Levien productized those ideas to
extract reputation of developers in ‘Advogato’ [Lev09];
and Sam Lessin [Les18] proposed using trust graphs
backed by financial commitments to infer the financial
trustworthiness of users in a graph in the context of
blockchains.
Academic works within this family of systems con-
sider general social network information distributed in
a peer to peer network to allow each node to determine
which other nodes are genuine or Sybils. In this line of
work SybilGuard [YKGF08] and SybilLimit [YGKX10]
perform a distributed computation, using random walks
in a network, to determine the honest regions within it.
SybilInfer [DM09] takes a centralized approach, and an-
alyzes a stored social graph to identify potential Sybil
regions.
These defences make some security assumptions re-
lated to the topology of ‘honest’ social graphs: those
need to be fast mixing, have small diameter, and con-
tain relatively few links to nodes being part of a Sybil at-
tack. Those systems allow each node to extract a degree
of belief about whether any other node in the system is a
genuine participant or a Sybil. However, this belief de-
pends on the position of the node in the social graph, and
may not be exactly the same even for two honest nodes
— thus they do not directly lead to any form of consen-
sus, not even about who is a Sybil node. Ultimately, each
node uses those degrees of belief to define their own set
of nodes considered honest.
Subsequent work questions a number of assump-
tions based on the analysis of real-world social
graphs [MTHK12]. This work is influential in that it
highlights that the social graphs on which these defences
rest, but truly capture trust judgments, and provide in-
centives for users to not accept any links, including to
malicious nodes. In this work we also highlight a further
limit of SybilInfer as originally proposed: it is an effec-
tive mechanism to detect Sybil regions in the presence of
an attack, however it is also presenting a large number of
“false positives” when the network is free of such attacks
— by misclasifying a large number of honest nodes as
Sybils. We provide a solution to this problem.
Besides ‘blockchain’ based consensus, based on a
chain of blocks and a fork choice rule, modern dis-
tributed ledgers consider and reimagine more traditional
forms of byzantine consensus. An exemplary sys-
tem is Tendermint [Kwo14], that combines a quorum
based byzantine consensus protocol, with a proof-of-
stake mechanism. In Tenderming, and in general, de-
cisions are made as part of the consensus protocol when
over two-thirds of ‘stake’ supports a decision— abstract-
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ing from the actual identities of nodes and only consid-
ering their weight in stake. The advantages of this ap-
proach is low latency, quick finality, and higher through-
put than Nakamoto consensus. This family of systems
also includes Blockmania [DH18], which separates mes-
sages materialized and exchanged in a network forming
a directed acyclic graph of blocks, from the process of
nodes independently interpreting it to reach consensus
and order transactions. This separation is key for the
practical and efficient implementation of SybilQuorum.
3 The SybilQuorum-core system
The SybilQuorum-core system is the purest instantiation
of the ideas behind SybilQuorum. It maintains a dis-
tributed ledger, including a social network of user trust
judgments about each other. In turn it leverages this in-
formation to maintain the network consistent across hon-
est users, and also to order arbitrary transactions. Its
key security property is that two nodes will accept the
same sequence of transactions if they are sufficiently re-
lated in the social graph, and sufficiently separated from
Sybil nodes. Those may then be used to implement any
distributed computation following the well established
state-machine replication paradigm [Sch90].
Security State of the Ledger. Each user maintain a local
copy of the ledger, which consists of two types of infor-
mation: security related information, and a sequence of
application transactions. The security information relates
to SybilQuorum operations, while the transactions can
be arbitrary and are never interpreted by SybilQuorum.
Specifically, the security information consists of a set of
directed links between users. A user Alice, represented
by a public key, may sign a statement that she trusts a
user Bob, by public key, to not be a Sybil: this becomes
an arc between Alice’s public key and Bob’s, denoted as
pkA → pkB. Alice may also sign a statement removing
such an arc – a sequence number prevents replay attacks
in either adding or removing such arcs. Signed state-
ments adding or removing links are processed through
the consensus protocol, and accepted (or not) by nodes
in the network — in a manner we will shortly examine.
When accepted the security information is updated to re-
flect the new social graph.
Ultimately at any moment each node has a representa-
tion of the security state of the ledger, namely a directed
graph of links between public keys.
Sybil Defences & the Security State. Upon every up-
date of the security state of the ledger a node performs an
analysis of the latest social graph to determine the proba-
bility with which each node may be controlled by a Sybil
attacker. Applying techniques from SybilInfer [DM09]
the outcome of the analysis for node vi is a map between
public keys of nodes pk j and a weight wi j ∈ [0,1] repre-
senting the probability the node is honest, represented as
pki → wi j.
We note this is local judgment: the node vi may as-
cribe a different weight to pk j, than node vi′ , namely in
general we expect wi j 6= wi′ j. This is the case even if
all nodes involved, namely vi, vi′ , and v j are all honest.
Thus the map, even between two honest nodes cannot be
assumed to be the same — and Sybil defences by them-
selves cannot in general achieve consensus; not even on
who is a Sybil.
Despite local judgments being different in their exact
details, we do not expect them to be uncorrelated. Since
at their core Sybil defencemechanisms applied by honest
nodes will tend to ascribe higher probability to nodes that
are honest, from those nodes that are actually part of a
large Sybil attack. Therefore we assume that the lists of
nodes that two honest nodes will extract from the Sybil
defence mechanism are going to be largely composed of
honest nodes, and also likely to be overlapping.
FromSybilInfer weights to presumed honest sets. Our
experiments with SybilInfer uncover a shortcomming of
the system as originally proposed. In the presence of
a Sybil attack, it is effective at detecting it — namely
setting the weights wi j as larger than y = 1/2 for honest
nodes, and lower for Sybil nodes. Therefore each node in
SybilQuorum may select a set of other nodes to consider
as honest according to the criterium wi j ≥ y.
However, its probabilistic model is calibrated assum-
ing there is an attack, and in the absence of a large
Sybil region it misclassifies a significant number of hon-
est nodes as Sybils. Therefore we need to set a dynamic
threshold y that is sensitive to whether a cut in the graph
is the result of a Sybil attack, or ‘natural’ given a social
network.
Our mechanism for calibrating the cut-off y is based
on the fundamental insights behind social network based
Sybil defences: we consider a region of the graph as be-
ing composed of Sybils, if the volume of links to this
region are comparatively low, compared with the size of
the honest graph, and in particular the number of links
within this honest sub-graph. We define the node set
Hy ⊆V containing all nodes v j with wi j ≥ y, and Sy ⊆V
with all the nodes v j such that wi j < y. We also define a
function L (N0,N1), over a set of nodes N0,N1 ⊆V , that
represent the number of unidirectional links between the
node sets N0 and N1. We select the largest cut-off value
y ∈ [0.45,0.55] such that L (Hy,Hy) > L (Ny,Sy). We
then use the selected value of y to define for each nodes
the set of honest nodes H(vi) = {v j |wi j ≥ y}.
Intuitively this selects a cut-off y that ensures that the
number of links to the Sybil region is indeed small, and
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in particular smaller than the number of links within the
honest region — a sign of an actual Sybil attack. Large
cuts in honest networks, will have a very large number of
links between the two honest regions. Since in a largely
honest graph the difference in weights wi j is due to the
nodes vi proximity to some nodes, more than others, the
actual number of links between the regions will be large,
and we would not select such a cut as a Sybil attack.
We validate this approach through experiments on real
graphs.
From social network Sybil defences to consensus. We
have already highlighted that the Sybil defences alone do
not lead to any sort of consensus between honest nodes.
However, we can leverage them, and the assumptions we
make about them to achieve consensus. To achieve con-
sensus we use the definitions, safety and liveness con-
ditions determined by the Stellar [Maz15] protocol for
Federated Byzantine Agreement Systems (FBAS).
Definition 1 (FBAS). A Federated Byzantine Agreement
System, or FBAS, is a pair 〈V,Q〉 consisting of a set
of nodes V and a quorum function Q : V → 22
V
\∅
specifying one of more quorum slices for each node,
where a node belongs to all of its own quorum slices—i.e.
∀v ∈ V,∀q ∈ Q(v),v ∈ q. (Note 2X denotes the powerset
of X.) (From [Maz15].)
Definition 2 (Quorum). A set of nodes U ⊆ V in FBAS
〈V,Q〉 is a quorum iff U 6= ∅ and U contains a slice for
each member—i.e. ∀v ∈ U,∃q ∈ Q(v) such that q ⊆ U.
(From [Maz15].)
We leverage SybilQuorum to create an FBAS in the
folowing manner. The set of all nodes V includes all
nodes vi in the system, honest and Sybils. Each honest
node uses the social network Sybil defence mechanism,
to define a list of nodes H(vi) that it considers honest. It
does so by including in H(vi) all nodes i such that wi j >
y, where y is the selected cutoff value in [0,1] (see above
for how to select y). The quorum slices for each node
Q(vi) are all the subset of H(vi) of cardinality greater
than 2/3|H(vi)|.
We discuss in our evaluation what it means for such an
FBAS system to be secure, and also provide a theory for
how to efficiently test an FBAS is secure.
4 The SybilQuorum-hybrid extensions
Previous work [MTHK12] argues that ‘natural’ social
graphs do not provide the fast mixing properties neces-
sary for reliably detecting Sybil attacks. Furthermore,
research suggests that, at least some, users are easily de-
frauded into connecting on social network platforms to
other users without much due diligence as to the identity
or trustworthiness of the profile.
We extend the SybilQuorum system, and describe
SybilQuorum-hybrid, that combines it with aspects of
proof-of-stake for two purposes: (1) as traditional proof-
of-stake it caps the ability of dishonest nodes to create
an infinity of identities at will; and (2) it provides in-
centives for honest nodes to be careful when connecting
to other nodes, and potential penalties for making poor
judgments. The first property keeps the number of po-
tential Sybil nodes low, while the second one supports
the key property necessary in social network Sybil de-
fences namely that the capacitance of the graph from the
honest region to the dishonest region remains small.
Token system. All proof-of-stake systems require a to-
ken system, with a fixed supply, to be integrated within
the security state of a ledger. Nodes may then ‘lock’
tokens as ‘stake’. SybilQuorum-hybrid also requires
such a token system, and it may be abstracted as a map
from accounts (as public keys) to token values, namely
pki → vi, maintained by all nodes. We consider those
tokens are not forgeable and are fungible, as per other
crypto-currencies.
Links with stake. SybilQuorum-hybrid allows nodes to
create arcs to other nodes representing judgments about
their trustworthiness, as part of the security state of
the system. However, unlike SybilQuorum-core, those
arcs are associated with a value in tokens. Such an
arc from Alice to Bob, with value vAB is denoted as
pkA
vAB−−→ pkB. The transaction creating those arcs is
signed by the originator Alice, using pkA, and the value
vAB is deducted from her account. Thus the security state
of SybilQuorum-hybrid consists of a directed weighted
graph between nodes.
SybilQuorum-hybrid enables not only the originators
or arcs to remove them, and recuperate the value assigned
to them, but also the destination of arcs. Therefore if an
arc pkA
vAB−−→ pkB exists in the system, Bob may issue a
transaction signed by pkB to remove the arc and increase
his balance by vAB. We allow both sides to reclaim the
value of a link in order to ensure it is a reliable signal to
others of the trust between nodes. Alice, by creating a
link with value vAB to Bob, trusts him to not immediately
or eventually ‘steal’ this value. Self-imposed vulnerabil-
ity implies trust, and signals it in a way that can be relied
upon by other nodes.
This vulnerability also penalizes honest nodes that
may be more likely to make poor trust decisions that de-
grade the overall social network Sybil defence mecha-
nism— assuming there is a different propensity amongst
honest nodes to make poor decisions. Such nodes will
pick dishonest nodes to make arcs to more often. Many
of those dishonest nodes will not be part of a Sybil attack,
but merely fraudsters that will simply reclaim the value.
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As a result bulk dishonesty, protects the system from
strategic dishonesty— honest nodes with poor judgment
are likely to be disincentivized from creating links, and
impoverished if they continue doing so recklessly.
Weighted social network defences. As soon as a
SybilQuorum-hybrid node updates the security state, and
in particular the weighted directed graph representing the
social network, it re-runs a Sybil Detection algorithm.
However, traditional social network Sybil detection al-
gorithms, such as SybilInfer do not operate on weighted
graphs — and require some modifications to operate.
We first prune the social graph from all arcs that are
not reciprocated namely all arcs connecting two nodes
pki→ pk j for which there is no arc pk j → pki. We define
the total value committed in remaining links by a node as
Vi =∑x∈N vix, where vix is the value assigned by ni to arcs
to each node nx (by convention we consider that if an arc
does not exist its value is zero).
Our goal is to then define a Markov-chain over the
nodes ni with a stationary distribution pi(ni) =
Vi
∑n∈NVn
,
namely one proportional to the amount of ‘stake’ each
node has committed to reciprocal links. (SybilInfer tar-
gets instead a uniform stationary distribution).
Any distribution g(ni|n j) that maintains ‘detailed bal-
ance’ would ensure this property, namely p(ni|n j) ·
pi(n j) = p(n j|ni) · pi(ni). However we wish to limit the
transition matrix of the chain to only have support on re-
ciprocal arcs. We therefore define a proposal distribution
for node ni as g(n j|ni)= vi j/Vi. This proposal is accepted
(following the Metropolis-HastingMCMCmethod) with
probability:
αi j =min
{
1,
pi(n j)
pi(ni)
·
g(ni|n j)
g(n j|ni)
}
(1)
=min
{
1,
V j/∑nVn
Vi/∑nVn
·
w ji/V j
wi j/Vi
}
(2)
=min
{
1,
w ji
wi j
}
(3)
Thus the transition matrix becomes:
p(n j|ni) = αi j ·wi j/Vi (4)
=min
{
wi j
Vi
,
w ji
Vi
}
(5)
with the remaining probability mass being assigned to
the self-transition p(ni|ni). Interestingly inter-node tran-
sitions are only influenced by the lower value of wi j and
w ji,
An walk on this Markov chain results at a node drawn
from the stationary distribution pi , as its length tends to-
wards infinity. However we want to leverage the prop-
erties of short random walk on such graphs: a path of
length ℓ=m · logN should converse towards pi , but would
be disrupted by the capacitance between the honest and
Sybil region in the graph. As a result short randomwalks
starting at an honest node will tend to remain within the
honest sub-graph. We denote the distribution of nodes
reached after such a short walk starting at an honest node
ni by pi
∗
i . Mathematically this means that for honest
nodes h∈N.pi∗i (nh)≥Vh/∑nVn and conversely for Sybil
nodes s ∈ N.pi∗i (ns)≤Vs/∑nVn.
We leverage this ‘gap’ and amplify it to penalize nodes
that are more likely to be Sybils, using the Logistic func-
tion:
Logistic(x,x0,k) =
1
1+ e−k(x−x0)
(6)
Each honest node vi assigns a probability to other nodes
v j being honest, computed as:
wi j = Logistic(pi
∗
i (n j),
V j
∑nVn
,k) (7)
The logistic term takes values in [0,1], with values closer
to zero if pi∗i undershoots the target pi , and closer to 1
if it overshoots it. The term then scales the stake of the
nodeV j, allowing it to take closer to its maximal value for
honest nodes; and becoming closer to zero for dishonest
nodes. The parameter k is a measure of how sharply de-
viations lead to minimum of maximum values, and can
be chosen by the nodes depending on their topology and
connectivity into the social graph.
Defining an FBAS.As for SybilQuorum-core, we define
an FBAS 〈V,Q〉, by having each node vi ∈V using the re-
sulting weights wi j and considering a set of nodes H(vi)
honest if those weights are at least a cutoff value wi j > y.
That cut-off value is selected as in SybilQuorum-core to
prevent large numbers of false positives. The quorum
function Q(vi) for each node vi, contains all subsets of
H(vi) of size greater than 2/3|H(vi)|.
5 The Security of an FBAS
Both proposed variants of SybilQuorum define a
Federated Byzantine Agreement System, as defined
in [Maz15]. We therefore use some further definitions
to achieve two security properties: (1) safety means that
two honest nodes will agree to the same outcome of the
consensus; and (2) liveness ensures that progress towards
reaching consensusmay be made despite some byzantine
nodes.
Definition 3 (Quorum Intersection). An FBAS enjoys
quorum intersection iff any two of its quorums share a
node—i.e., for all quorums U1 and U2, U1 ∩U2 6= ∅.
(From [Maz15])
5
Definition 4 (Delete). If 〈V,Q〉 is an FBAS and
B ⊆ V is a set of nodes, then to delete B from
〈V,Q〉, written 〈V,Q〉B, means to compute the modi-
fied FBAS 〈V \B,QB〉 where QB(v) = {q \B|q ∈ Q(v)}.
(From [Maz15])
Definition 5 (DSet). Let 〈V,Q〉 be an FBAS and B ⊆ V
be a set of nodes. We say B is a dispensible set, or DSet,
iff:
1. (quorum intersection despite B) 〈V,Q〉B enjoys quo-
rum intersection.
2. (quorum availability despite B) Either V \ B is a
quorum in 〈V,Q〉 or B=V.
(From [Maz15])
The concept of ‘dispensible set’ (DSet) in an FBAS
is key to understanding its security. The DSet contains
a set of nodes that can act adversarially, without jeopar-
dizing the safely and liveness properties of the FBAS for
the remaining (honest) nodes. The ‘quorum intersection
despite B’ property ensures safety, since it requires any
two quorums within a system without B nodes to inter-
sect, and thus agree on the same result. The ‘liveness
despite B property’ ensures the set of honest nodes in the
FBAS can form a consensus to agree on a result, even if
the nodes in B do not participate.
In our experiments, to establish the security of
SybilQuorum as an FBAS system, we will need to de-
termine the necessary DSet, containing byzantine nodes,
as well as potentially some honest nodes for whom Sybil
defences failed. However, establishing the ‘quorum in-
tersection despite B’ property of a DSet not easy: naively
it would require computing all quorums and testing their
pairwise intersection—which is computationally unfea-
sible for larger number of nodes. Therefore we devise
two algorithms to determine the DSet is a quorum (prop-
erty 2) and also to check quorum intersection despite the
DSet (property 1), efficiently. The correctness of those
algorithms depends on original theorems related to an
FBAS, which may also be of independent interest.
We first prove a lemma, on which we rely for the cor-
rectness of our algorithm.
Lemma 1. Consider a node v ∈ V in an FBAS 〈V,Q〉,
and a quorumU, such that v∈U, and a quorum slice q∈
Q(v) for v contained inU, namely q∈U. If another node
v′ is in the same slice, namely v′ ∈ q, and the minimum
cardinally of any quorum that contains v′ is h—i.e. for
all quorum U ′, such that v′ ∈ U ′, h ≤ |U ′|. Then the
minimum cardinally of U is also h—i.e. h≤ |U |.
Proof. The theorem seems complex, but really is the re-
sult of a simple symmetry: since the quorum slice q is
contained inU , both v ∈ q and v′ ∈ q are within the quo-
rum, {v,v′} ⊆U . Since h is the minimal cardinality of
a quorum containing v′, and the quorumU also contains
v′, it trivially follows that h≤U .
Definition 6 (Quorum Slice Cardinality Map). The func-
tion C(v) is the quorum slice cardinality Map for an an
FBAS 〈V,Q〉. For each node v ∈ V in , it returns the
cardinality of the smallest quorum slice in Q(v)—i.e.
C(v) =min{|q| |q ∈ Q(v)}.
Security Theorem 1 (Trivial Intersection). For an
FBAS, if all values of the quorum slice cardinality map
are larger than half the number of nodes, it enjoys quo-
rum intersection—i.e. ∀v ∈V,C(v)> |V |/2.
Proof. Consider two nodes and quorums in the FBAS,
v1 ∈ U1 and v2 ∈ U2. By the definition of quorums
there must exist two slices q1 ∈ Q(v1),q2 ∈ Q(v2) of
v1,v2 respectively such that q1 ⊆U1 and q2 ⊆U2. Since
|q1| > |V |/2 and |q2| > |V |/2, it must be that they in-
tersect at least in one element. And q1 ∪ q2 6= ∅ ⇔
q1∩U1∩q2∩U2 6=∅⇒U1∩U2 6=∅.
This first theorem provides a trivial way to check a
FBAS for quorum intersection: if all quorum slices, for
all nodes contain more than half the nodes, then all quo-
rums will intersect. However, this condition is much
stronger than necessary for quorum intersection, and in
practice not always achievable. However, it is the prop-
erty on which the security of traditional BFT systems can
be proven in when those are encoded as FBAS. However,
we will seek a weaker property that still implies quorum
intersection.
Lemma 2 (Minimum Quorum Cardinality in FBAS).
Consider the FBAS 〈V,Q〉. We define a function Fi(v)
providing a lower bound on the cardinality of any quo-
rumU containing v, namely ∀U, i such that v∈U it holds
that Fi(v) ≤ |U |. We initialize F as F0(v) =C(v), where
C is the quorum slice cardinality map. We also define
the sets q¯v ⊆ for each v ∈ V, containing all nodes in v’s
quorum slices—i.e. q¯v =
⋃
q∈Q(v) q.
Define as S the sequence of values [Fi(v
′) |v′ ∈ q¯v] in
ascending order, and Si[C(v)] is its C(v)
th element. If we
assign Fi+1(v)←max{Si[C(v)], Fi(v)}, the value Fi+1(v)
is also a lower bound on the cardinally of any quorum
containing v.
Proof. By the definition of the quorum slice cardinality
map C it is trivial to argue that F0(v) = C(v) is a lower
bound on the cardinality of all quorums including v, since
they each need to fully contain at least one quorum slice
from v. We need to show that the value Fi(v) and therefor
Si[C(v)] is a lower bound on the cardinality of any quo-
rum U containing v. Since the minimum quorum slice
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size of v is C(v) it must contain at least that number of
nodes, out of the set q¯v. By lemma 1 we know that in-
cluding a node v′ from q¯ into a quorum U , would yield
a quorum of cardinality at least Fi(v
′). Since C[v] such
nodes from q¯v must be included the minimum cardinal-
ity of U is Si[C(v)], since Si is defines as the ordered se-
quence of minimum cardinality sizes for quorums each
node in q¯v.
We use this lemma in building an algorithm that com-
putes lower bounds on the cardinalities quorums of all
nodes in the FBAS iterativelly. It starts with an estima-
tion equal to the cardinality of the smallest quorum slice
for each node (the function L(v)), and then increases
the estimate as Fi+1(v) ← max(Fi(v), Si[L(v)]), where
Si = [Fi(v
′) |v′ ∈ q¯v].
Based on the above we can efficiently estimate min-
imum bounds on the cardinality of all quorums in the
SybilQuorumFBAS. Then we can test them to show quo-
rum intersection:
Security Theorem 2 (Quorum Intersection due to Min-
imum Size). If within a FBAS, all quorums U have car-
dinality |U |> |V |/2, it enjoys quorum intersection.
Proof. Trivially, if we have two setsU1 ⊆V andU2 ⊆V
with a number of elements greater than half the number
of elements in V , they must intersect in at least one ele-
ment.
We note that Quorum Intersection due to Minimum
Size is a sufficient condition to guarantee a FBAS enjoys
quorum intersection, but it is too strong to be necessary.
For example an FBAS with a dictator node v0 present
in all quorums, will satisfy trivially quorum intersection,
without the need for all quorums to be of a certain size.
Computing DSets and FBAS safety. We leverage the
theorems above to test the concrete FBAS extracted from
SybilQuorum for safety and liveness. We define a set of
nodes V , each with a list H(v) ⊆ V of nodes they con-
sider honest, and a set of malicious nodes B. The quo-
rum function Q(v) contains all subsets of H(v) of size
over 2/3|H(v)|.
First we execute a procedure DETERMINEDSET us-
ing the initial bad nodes B to determine a set B′ of nodes
that cannot reach agreement, due to having accepted too
many bad nodes as honest. Following the terminology
from Stellar we call the set of nodes B′ \ B befouled
nodes. A node is befouled if it has accepted in its set
H(v)more than a third of bad or befouled nodes. By def-
inition the nodes V \B′ still constitute a quorum. (Thus
proving liveness despite B′).
Once we have identified the set of bad and befouled
nodes B′, we define the FBAS 〈V,Q〉B
′
and try to es-
tablish whether it enjoys quorum intersection. We use
algorithm DETERMINESAFETY to test for quorum in-
tersection: we iteratively determine an increasingly bet-
ter lower bound Fi(v) on the quorum cardinality of each
node. Once the bound converges, we check that each
Fi(v) > |V \B
′|/2, which according to our theorems en-
sures quorum intersection (Thus proving quorum inter-
section despite B′). If this condition is true we label our
FBAS as safe, since the set B′ is a DSet.
6 Experimental Evaluation
Datasets& Pre-processing. An evaluation of SybilQuo-
rum necessitates the use of real-world datasets of social
connections, since the mechanism relies on the dynamics
of connections within ‘real’ social networks. There are
methodological challenges to doing this. First, there does
not exist a network embodying the proposed mechanism
of establishing links backed by mutual token on links
as necessary by SybilQuorum-hybrid. Second, existing
datasets are based on networks for casual socializing, in
which incentives are not aligned for careful selection of
links, but rather provide advantages and incentives for
users to be prosmicuous in their connections. Those is-
sues present threats to validity.
For our evaluation we chose to use the pokec network
dataset, that is open and available on the Stanford large
network dataset collection1. This is a snapshop of the
largest social network provider in Slovakia, collected in
2012. It contains 1632803 nodes and 30622564 edges.
We pre-process this network in two ways, to produce
evaluation datasets: (1) We sub-sample 200000 nodes
from the network, and create a subgraph with all their
edges (including those to nodes not in the set of nodes);
(2) We then recursively prune the network to a core of
nodes with degree at least 3. Pruning is performed by
removing nodes with degree less than 3, until all nodes
have a higher degree.
These operations result in sub-graphs of size about
10000 nodes, which is comparable to the number of min-
ers in systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. We ex-
tract the degree three core of the network as a proxy for
nodes that have strong connections to each other, exclud-
ing nodes with weaker trust connections between them.
(Note such pre-processing can also done as part of a pro-
duction SybilQuorum pipeline.)
Sybil Attack Simulation. To evaluate SybilQuorum we
simulate Sybil attacks on the graph datasets, in a what
that is most generic. We parametrize the attack through
a number of parameters: (1) the number of Sybil nodes
(ns); (2) the number of links or amount of stake on links
purely in the Sybil region (ls); (3) the amount of stake on
1https://snap.stanford.edu/data/soc-Pokec.html
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function DETERMINEDSET(〈V,Q〉,B)
H(v)←
⋃
q∈Q(v) q
exit← False
while not exit do
exit← True
for all V \B do
if |H(v)\B|> 2 · |H(v)∩B| then
B← B∪{v}
exit← False
end if
end for
end while
return B
end function
function DETERMINESAFETY(〈V,Q〉)
H(v)←
⋃
q∈Q(v) q
C(v)←min{|q| for q ∈ Q(v)}
i← 0
Fi(v)←C(v)
exit← False
while not exit do
exit← True
for all V \B do
S← sorted([Fi(v
′) for v′ ∈ H(v)])
Fi+1(v)←max{Fi(v), Si[C(v)]}
if Fi+1(v) 6= Fi(v) then
exit← False
end if
end for
i← i+ 1
end while
return ∀v ∈V.Fi(v)> |V |/2
end function
Figure 1: Algorithms to determine safe set and quorum intersection
links between the honest region and Sybil region (ln); (4)
the fraction of honest nodes that are naive, and connect
to Sybil nodes ( fn).
Given those parameters, we instanciate a set of Sybil
nodes of size ns, and establish ls mutual links between
them at random. We sample at random a set of hon-
est nodes to be ‘naive’, as a fraction fn of the honest
nodes. We then create mutual connections between ran-
dom Sybil nodes in that set, and honest nodes from the
naive set, according to the budget of links or stake avail-
able (ln).
SybilInfer [DM09] provides an argument that the ex-
act composition of the Sybil region does not impact se-
curity, but what matters is rather the relative size of the
Sybil region and the links between honest and Sybil re-
gions. However, we there might be optimizations in con-
necting Sybils in specific ways to the naive nodes, which
we have not explored. This is a further threat to the va-
lidity of our results. However, our methodology is in line
with previous works.
Purely Benign or Byzantine Conditions. We first eval-
uate the SybilQuorum mechanism in a network com-
posed of overwhelmingly benign nodes. We instanciate
such a network by only attaching a single Sybil (n=1),
no stake in the Sybil region (ls = 0), and minimal stake
between the honest and dishonest nodes (ln = 2). On
the other hand we allow this single Sybil nodes to con-
nect to any honest node ( fn = 1.0). We primarily use
this condition to ensure that SybilQuorum does not suffer
from false positives in detecting Sybils, that compromise
agreement, as the raw SybilInfer mechanism does.
We also evaluate SybilQuorum under conditions of
byzantine attacks that can be accommodated within the
traditional Byzantine fault tolerance paradigm, with just
a standard proof-of-stake system: where the number of
Sybils ns is 1/3 of the size of the honest nodes, and the
stake of all links connected to the Sybil nodes is at most
1/2 of the total stake in the honest region. We also allow
Sybil nodes to connect to any honest node ( fn = 1.0).
This condition simulates an attack that can be tolerated
even if all Sybil nodes are accepted as honest by all – but
we need to assess whether this is the case in SybilQuo-
rum and whether the resulting FBAS is secure.
In both conditions SybilQuorum honest nodes reach
safe agreement. In the benign condition the cut-off is de-
termined as y = 0.49, and all nodes are accepted by all
other honest nodes as honest. This includes the single
Sybil node. All quorums are larger than half the num-
ber of honest nodes, and global agreement is reached. In
the byzantine condition agreement is also reached. The
cut-off value is set automatically as y= 0.50. And since
all honest nodes have fewer than 1/3 links to Sybil nodes
(none is confused) they reach agreement. (Those are the
results of 10 repeats of the experiments, for different con-
figurations of the Sybil attack).
Those results confirm that SybilQuorum performs no
worse than not using SybilQuorum— which is not a
given: (1) when there is no Sybil attack it does not im-
pede agreement through false positives; and (2) when
there are fewer than 1/3 dishonest nodes, the FBAS is
secure and preserves agreement and liveness without any
negative interference from SybilQuorum.
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Future Evaluation. The analysis above, concerning be-
nign and byzantine settings will be extended in the full
paper to establish the security of SybilQuorum for:
• Variable Number of Adversarial Nodes
• Variable Size of Adversarial Stake
• Variable Numbers of Confused Honest Nodes
• Variable Size of Honest-Sybil Links
7 Conclusions
In this work we show that we can leverage social
networks to protect traditional Proof-of-Stake systems
against a wider range of attacks, from nodes with a lot of
stake, than previously expected. To do so it is necessary
to abstract their consensus mechanisms within the more
general FBAS framework, and also devise efficient tests
for whether such an FBAS is secure to support experi-
mental evaluations. The degree to which this mechanism
is effective is subject to extended evaluation, which will
be ready for the Stanford Blockchain Conference.
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